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Theme: The failure of counterintelligence to prevent and pre-emptively disrupt terrorist 
plans and networks is highlighted in this paper as the single most critical flaw highlighted 
by the Domodedovo attack and other recent terrorist incidents in Russia. 
 
 
Summary: When considering the terrorist attack at Moscow’s Domodedovo airport 
perpetrated on 24 January 2011 it is important to consider the broader security and policy 
implications. This paper describes how this latest incident in a long series of mass-casualty 
attacks in Russia is similar to and different from previous ones. It reviews some of the 
general flaws in public transport security and in the protection-centred measures 
undertaken in response to the blast. It notes that the fundamental socio-political causes of 
terrorism will persist in Russia for the foreseeable future, arguing that effective 
counterterrorism is about minimising terrorist manifestations under given conditions. It 
questions the excessive focus on physical protection measures and argues for a better 
balance between protection and resilience strategies. It identifies the failure of 
counterintelligence to prevent and pre-emptively disrupt terrorist plans and networks as the 
single most critical flaw highlighted by the Domodedovo attack and other recent terrorist 
incidents in Russia. 
 
 
 
Analysis: On 24 January 2011 a man carrying around 7 kg of explosives blew himself up 
–or was blown up from a distance– at the international arrivals hall of Moscow’s 
Domodedovo airport, which was crowded with passengers and frequented by taxi drivers 
and Muscovites who were waiting to meet colleagues, friends or relations. Five days later, 
Russia’s Investigative Committee announced that the perpetrator had general links to the 
North Caucasus, but gave no specific information. 
 
If the attack achieved its ‘surprise’ effect, it was largely due to the choice of target –after 
all, it hardly occurred out of the blue or in a vacuum–. Less than a month before the airport 
blast, another unrelated group was planning a terrorist attack in downtown Moscow for the 
New Year holidays but the plot failed, as the explosive device reportedly detonated 
prematurely at what was still a preparatory stage on 31 December. Barely two days after 
the Domodedovo attack, a major car blast occurred near a café in Khasav-Yurt, while five 
days later a bomb exploded under a train (both occurred in the unstable North Caucasus 
republic of Dagestan). 
 
Nor was the latest Domodedovo attack unprecedented in scale. In terms of the overall 
number of victims and its political impact, it fell far short of the largest and deadliest 
terrorist attacks in Russia over the past decade and a half, including the Budennovsk and 
Kyzliar terrorist raids in 1995-96, the 1999 apartment-building bombings in Moscow and 
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other cities, several passenger aircraft bombings and the large-scale hostage crises in 
Moscow (2002) and Beslan (2004). However, it was, indeed, a large-scale attack, with a 
single blast resulting in almost as many fatalities (35) and injured people (over 120) as the 
two previous terrorist bombings in Moscow –the nearly simultaneous blasts in the two 
central underground stations on 29 March 2010 that killed 40 people and injured 100–. 
 
What’s New? 
Still, this latest blast in the long list of large-scale terrorist attacks in Russian urban areas 
and transport systems has demonstrated at least two new inter-related features. Both have 
to do with the choice of target, with (a) a large central airport building (rather than 
passenger aircraft) successfully targeted for the first time, and (b) the clear intention by the 
perpetrators, whoever they may be, to have both domestic and foreign casualties involved. 
That said, the latter should not necessarily be seen as an indicator, let alone proof, of a 
foreign connection in the attacks. The hasty attempts by the media or certain 
commentators to link the attack to foreign sources, including absurd references to 
Palestinian or Pakistani connections, lack any solid evidence at the time of writing. 
 
Politically, as always, the two focal points remain the same ‘main Russian questions’ that 
were formulated in the classic literature of the 19th century and since then have invariable 
been raised under dramatic circumstances in a variety of contexts: ‘whom to blame?’ and 
‘what is to be done?’. What is distinctive about the political and security implications of the 
Domodedovo blast is that, for the first time, it is the latter question, not the former, that 
strongly dominates the political discourse in its aftermath. Normally, the reverse has been 
the case, with the emphasis being placed on the perpetrators –their identity, motivation, 
origin and links and on the role of the North Caucasus as a source of terrorism and 
instability–. But this time, like a dozen times before, the perpetrator’s general link to the 
North Caucasus was established relatively quickly and it appeared not only to hardly 
surprise anybody, but even to hardly bother anyone, at least inside Russia. Prime Minister 
Putin and representatives of the Russian Anti-terrorism Committee were careful to scotch 
any premature speculations about the specific involvement of Chechen or Nogai Islamists. 
Even the speculation about potential international implications, given a number of foreign 
casualties, fell far short of the familiar trend towards ‘al-Qaedaisation’. 
 
This time, the motivations underlying the attack were almost completely overshadowed by 
the primary focus on systemic flaws in transport infrastructure security and by the harsh 
criticism of the performance of security services, coming from both outside and within the 
government. The public focus appears to have shifted from ‘who’s to blame?’ to a broader 
‘what went wrong?’. This can, in fact, be seen as a sign of the indirect general 
acknowledgement, rather than denial, of the long-term and persistent nature of the factors 
underlying terrorist violence in Russia. It appears to be no longer seriously questioned that 
terrorist attacks are likely to continue on a regular enough basis for Muscovites, and 
travellers in particular, to feel largely in the hands of fate in public places, but that at the 
same time they will be sufficiently irregular occurrences to prevent attacks from becoming 
banal and to maximise the public and political effects of every future major terrorist 
incident. A wary, but realistic understanding has been arising that counterterrorism 
capacity should be qualitatively upgraded on the assumption that the main underlying 
conditions and ‘root causes’ for continuing terrorist activity are likely to persist into the 
foreseeable and even distant future. As vividly illustrated by the reactions to the latest 
terrorist attack in Moscow, this assumption is becoming increasingly widespread, 
especially among the general public and security professionals, even if it is less willingly 
shared by some politicians and pundits. 
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Public Transport Security: State and Private Sectors 
Major security breaches and overall security failure at the airport highlighted by the 24 
January blast have not been disputed by anyone in Russia, the most senior officials 
included. While responsibility for the open-access space (‘dirty area’) at Domodedovo 
should have lain with all the main security structures, the airport’s own security service and 
the Ministry of Interior (MVD) airport unit have been singled out for particular blame. 
 
The MVD’s poor handling of prophylactic measures in the airport’s public access area, 
including its failure to systematically employ existing X-ray checks and to apply them to all 
public entrances, should, however, be placed in context. What stands out in this context is 
the government’s clearly premature decision to dissolve the MVD’s specialised 
antiterrorism units in 2008 in response to a four-year-long decline in terrorist activity that 
has, however, been followed by a new surge. The move left such first-rate security issues 
as hedging against terrorists largely at the discretion of the privately-owned airport and its 
security service. The reality is that the issue of the state/private balance and partnership in 
public and other critical infrastructure security was not systematically addressed in Russia 
prior to the Domodedovo attack. However, much of the ensuing discussion boiled down to 
attempts by select officials to shift not only the main blame for the blast itself, but also 
almost the full burden of responsibility for airport security onto private businesses. 
 
For the sake of a more balance view, according to existing regulations the airport security 
service was only entrusted with ensuring the maximum safety within the ‘clean access’ 
area past registration and the mandatory luggage and passenger security checks, as 
rightly noted by Domodedovo’s spokeswoman. This is exactly what the airport did by 
having qualitatively upgraded ‘clean area’ security over the past years and introducing and 
systematically applying to that object the best technical equipment to be found in Russian 
airports (it was the first in Russia to employ the highly-sophisticated full-body scanners). 
The upgrade came about as a result of the August 2004 terrorist attacks, when two 
outbound Domodedovo passenger planes were blown up in mid-air by female Chechen 
suicide bombers who managed to board the plane at the airport. 
 
It should also be noted that, in the wake of the Domodedovo attack, the airport staff 
showed a significant degree of resilience in facilitating a rapid first response and in 
continuing operations, resuming full operational capacity within hours. Another minor, but 
positive, new development was a host of self-organised initiatives to help passengers after 
the blast (with people driving cars to the airport to offer free transport to the city). This 
came about through the medium of Internet-based social networks and blogs that were 
also one of the major sources of information on the attack and its aftermath (including, by 
some unverifiable bloggers’ accounts, the President himself). Remarkably, in both cases, it 
was a case of private initiative and actors (businesses in the former case, private 
individuals in the latter case), not about state policy and structures. 
 
Some of the main differences between many Western states (societies), on the one hand, 
and other large states such as Russia or China, on the other, are in their degree of state 
and private control of critical infrastructures. In the West, the need to protect partly or 
largely decentralised privately-owned and run assets that make up a significant or even the 
lion’s share of critical, especially public transport, infrastructure (85% of all critical 
infrastructure in the US) has long been recognised as a security challenge in its own right, 
requiring comprehensive and precise regulation and division of responsibilities. In 
countries such as China or Russia, the much higher degree of default state control implies 
the need for a greater state role in infrastructure protection. The gradual privatisation of 
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major public transport systems has deficiently taken into account the related security 
implications and has not been matched by the necessary adjustments to existing 
regulations and practices. The resulting security vacuum can quickly turn into chaos under 
stress, regardless of the cause (be it a terrorist attack or a major technological disruption). 
At present, in Russia, perhaps more than anywhere else, nothing can substitute for the 
state’s leading role and responsibility for public transport and other critical infrastructure 
security, especially as regards both more specialised counterterrorism tasks and broader 
antiterrorism activities. After all, security in general and antiterrorism in particular have 
been one the Russian government’s key declared priorities for the past decade. 
 
Beyond Protection: Resilience 
So far, the reaction of the state to the Domodedovo bombing has in many ways resembled 
the typical upgrade of general, mostly defensive, measures centred on physical protection 
that has followed every large-scale attack in Russia since the late 1990s and that then 
somehow fades away, although not without leaving some trace. Other typical measures 
include the amendments to anti-terrorist legislation that have been abundant in the past 
years. Along these partly chaotic and usually short-term and temporary reactions, some 
measures, however, are likely to stay for good and might even have a limited, but not 
negligible, longer-term security impact. Some of the measures suggested have already 
made it into Presidential orders to various Ministries. They include the drafting of a federal 
law on explosives and their marking for the purpose of detection by mid-2011, exploring 
the need for an integrated inter-agency body to supervise the development, production and 
use of technical security equipment on transport systems and in other public places and 
expanding the special cynologist service. Existing practices and regulations in a number of 
foreign countries affected by terrorism (including Spain, especially with regards to security 
measures on both air and rail transport) could be quite useful in this respect. 
 
While tougher protective measures to increase transport and other critical infrastructure 
security are needed, a policy that emphasises protective measures is hardly fully adequate 
to the task. The basic starting point is that not all infrastructures can be protected from all 
threats and the level of protection cannot be the same for all critical infrastructures by 
default. While not all infrastructure systems are ‘soft targets’ (civil nuclear power plants are 
some of the best-guarded facilities), many other physical infrastructures and especially 
transport, information and communications systems are much less protected and often 
physically too extended to be fully protected. The range of vulnerable non-military targets 
is very wide and no state or society, however developed and economically advanced, can 
afford to protect them all. The large number and diversity of vulnerable ‘soft’ targets and 
the variety of forms and manifestations of terrorism, even in Russia where terrorism of 
North Caucasian origin still predominates, make it hard to predict the location and time of 
the next massive attack, including concrete critical infrastructure targets. 
 
The past and present dynamics of terrorist attacks reveal that the main vulnerabilities to 
massive terrorist attacks have been underscored by the conjunction of major public 
gatherings and public infrastructure, especially public transport systems. However, as 
security increases around more predictable targets (for instance, airports and airlines), 
terrorists tend to shift their focus to less protected assets. In other words, if terrorists need 
a ‘critical’ target, they will find one: putting sophisticated scanners at airport entrances may 
increase the risk of explosions in passenger crowds just outside the airport building as they 
wait to go through security checks. More generally, enhancing counterterrorist protection 
measures for one target only makes it more likely for terrorists to favour another. This can 
be illustrated by the relatively recent worldwide trend of an increasing number of mass-
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casualty attacks against transport infrastructures other than air transport (in parallel to the 
generally enhanced security measures for air transport). 
 
In sum, a better balance between protection measures and resilience strategies (aimed at 
strengthening adaptation, flexibility and endurance capacities), rather than a mere 
obsession with physical protection measures for select targets against select threats, could 
prove to be a sounder guiding principle for policy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Counterterrorism and counterintelligence 
Neither transport-system managers, nor specialised state counterterrorist units –in Russia 
or elsewhere– can be held responsible for the persisting political conditions necessary for 
terrorism, nor for its deeper and poorly-addressed socio-political and other causes. But 
effective counterterrorism in a narrower sense –as a specific task, function and segment of 
the state’s security sector– is not about removing the deeper underlying causes of 
terrorism. That is a long-term task which requires the combined efforts of both state and 
society, but for which the ultimate responsibility lies with a country’s political leadership (in 
state systems that involve a degree of government accountability). The essence of 
effective counterterrorism is to minimise terrorist manifestations under given conditions –
even when acting on the assumption that the basic causes of terrorism will not be removed 
in any foreseeable future–. 
 
Hence, the critical role in counterterrorism centres on prevention, pre-emption and the pre-
emptive disruption of terrorist networks, plans and actions. These tasks will not be solved 
by adding more metal detectors, while popular calls for introducing advanced profiling 
techniques at a few select locations only affect the tip of the iceberg. Effective prevention 
and pre-emptive disruption require sophisticated and solid professional state counter-
intelligence capacities tailored to counter-terrorism needs and specifics. This also brings 
us back to the need for a better knowledge not only of the general nature and type of 
terrorist threats, but of the methods, organisational systems and ‘routes’ of terrorist actors. 
Such a counter-intelligence capacity involves, and is completely dependent on, not only 
accurate and solid intelligence of a strategic, psychological and tactical nature, collected 
on a permanent, rather than case-file basis through all available human and technical 
means, but also the analytical capacity to interpret this intelligence in a timely manner and, 
above all, the ability to take decisions promptly based on it, including targeted special 
operations. 
 
The Domodedovo blast, in the general context of terrorist activity in Russia, has 
highlighted again, but hardly for the last time, the lack or ineffectiveness of such a 
capacity. This is particularly striking in view of the major role and almost unparalleled clout 
of the security service in Russia’s domestic politics and governance. This general counter-
intelligence failure is perhaps the least discussed, but the single most critical flaw in the 
ability of the Russian state to hedge against terrorist threats. Above all, the latest in a 
series of deadly terrorist attacks in Moscow underscores the urgent need for the qualitative 
upgrading of the state’s counterterrorist intelligence capacity to prevent and pre-emptively 
disrupt more attacks –even if the general level of terrorist threats remains high–. 
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